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IN THE SUPREME COURT· 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------~------------------------------------
LORRAINE JANE WlLCKEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. CASE NO. 16,772 
LEONARD THEODORE WILCKEN, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
--------------------------------------------
BRIEF O;F APPELLANT 
--------------------------------------------
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the plaintiff for Divorce with the 
attendant issues of property settlement, debt -allocation and 
alimony. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The plaintiff's complaint in this action was filed on 
May 11, 1978, with the court entering its temporary order on 
June 22, 1978. (.R. 1-3, 10} .. The matter was heard by the 
court on the merits for the f~rst time on November 27, 1978. 
(R. 17-19). The court concluded the trial on December 13, 1978. 
(R. 17, 21-22). ,At the conclusion of the December 13, 1978, 
hearing, the court granted eac.h of the parties a divorce 
to become final upon entry. tR. 18). The court signed 
the findings of fact and conclusions of law granting the divorce 
on January 8, 1979. (R. 26-27) ~ The court retained jurisdiction 
over the property of the parties pending the order of the court 
dividing the same. (R. 18). Counsel for both sides were ordered 
to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
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(R.18). 
The court made its decision relating to the property of th~ 
parties by an Orde;r- dated .May 17, 1979. (R. 31-34) . Th,-; 
court signed the amended findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and decree incorporating the property distribution on the 10th 
day of July, 1979. CR. 69-80) • 
The plaintiff made its first motion to amend the Decree on 
June 19, 1979, (R. 67) which was heard on August 14, 1979. 
(R. 97}. The court partially_ granted the plaintiff's motion to 
amend by its ruling dated September 13, 1979 (R. 24-26) and 
signed the second amended findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and decree on October 4, 1979. (R. 131-144). 
The plaintiff moved the court for a new trial on September 
23, 1979, on the basis of newly discovered evidence, the 
insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict and the 
error of the court in applying the law. (R. 128). 
The court heard oral arguments on the plaintiff's motion 
on November 9, 1979, (R. 183} and the Court made its ruling 
amending again its prior decree on November 13, 1979. (R. 184, 
186-87} .. 
The plaintiff f ,iled her Notice of Appeal on November 20_, 
19 7 9 . (R • 19 4 } • 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests this Court to amend the judgment 
to conform to the appellant's position on appeal, or, in the 
alternative, remand the case for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF ~ACTS 
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The appellant and respondent were married on November 22, 
1972, in Salt Lake City, Utah. There were no children born 
as issue of the marriage. (T. 1,26). The appellant is in her 
late fifties and the respondent in his early sixties. (T .. 209). 
The appellant had been single for eighteen years prior to her 
marriage to the respondent. (T. 214). The appellant owned a 
.home iri Wisconsin prior to coming to Utah and applied the monthly 
rental receipts in the amount of $300.00 to the marriage endeavor. 
(T. 213-4). At the time of their marriage the respondent was 
living with his brother in a trailer. (T. 215). The respondent 
was employed by the Utah Department of Transportation where he 
had a substantial ret.;lrement benefit. (R. 39, 45). During the 
early part of ·the marriage, the appellant was· responsible for 
paying for common_living expenses which she estimated to be 
$8,500.00 the first year. (T. 243, 277}. The appellant spent 
$6, 62-6 .13 over the mar;r;-iage term from her separate monies to 
maintain the household. lT. 282). 
The parties acquired various pieces of.real property du~ing 
the cou.rse of thei;i:;- inarr.;iage which are set out in the second 
amended findings of fact and conclusions of law. (R. 131-44). 
The dispute on appeal is centered around the distribution of 
real property, the failure of the trial court to debit the 
respondent's pre-marital assets with his pre-marital debits, the 
denial of appellant's motion for a new trial and the error of the 
court in debit.;lng the plainti~f 's pre-marital assets in the 
amount of $10,000.00. 
POINT l 
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THE COURT ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING THE REAL 
PROPERTY OF TH.E PARTIES. 
It is well established that a party seeking a reversal 
of the trial court's distribution of property must .Prove a 
misunderstanding or misapplication of the 
law resulting in substantial and prejudi-· 
cial error, or that such a serious inequity 
resulted from the order as to constitute 
an abuse of the trial court's discretion. 
Mccrary v. McCrary, 599 P.2d 1248, 1250 (Utah, 1979); Mitchell 
v. Mitchell, 527 P.2d 1359 (Utah, 1974). Once that test is 
met the Court may either exercise its own prerogative of 
making a modification in the decree or remand for entry of a 
modified decree by the trial court. Read v. Read, 594 P.2d 
871, 873 (Utah, 1979), Utah Const. Art. VIII, Sec. 9; 
Humphreys v. Humphreys, 520 P.2d ·193 (Utah, 1974}; Hard.ing v. 
Harding, 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 308 (1971}. 
The trial court has the obligation of making a fair and 
equitable distribution of property so as to allow for the pro-
tection and welfare of the parties to a divorce proceeding. 
Utah Code Annotated, §30-3-5 (19531; Pearson v. Pearson, 561 
p·.2d 1080 (Utah, 1977); Sea;cle v. Searle, 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 
19 7 4) . 
The Court in this case divided the assets of the marriage 
by first determining what property the parties had kept as 
separate property and thus not corruningled with the assets of 
the marriage.· The ap~ellant claims no error with respect to 
the determination of separate property. The Court accordingly 
allowed each party to retain their own separate property which 
-4-
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is delineated in the findings of fact. (R. 132-133, paragraphs 
1, 3, · 4, Sa) . 
The Court then valued the pre-marital assets of the parties 
and gave each party a credit to be used as an off-set when 
the property was sold or divided .. The Court gave each party the 
right to retain their pre-marital property and deduct the fair 
market value of the property from the total value of their 
pre-marital assets. lR. 132-34, paragraphs 2, 10; R. 185, 
paragraph 2}. 
The real property which the parties ow·n.ed at one time 
or another is described as follows: 1) Independence Property, 
composed of approximately 160 acres; 2} White Rocks Property, 
broken into two pieces comprising approximately 16 acres; 3) 
Gusher Property, which was approximately 26 acres; 4) The 
North Fork Property composed of approximately 10 acres; 5) 
and th.e North Fork :Property composed of 11 acres with a cabin 
situated thereon; and 61 the Bluebell Property comprised.of 
approximately 114 acres. (l? 1. Ex . 1) . 
The Court ordered all the real property sold and the 
proceeds divided evenly between the parties with the exception 
of the Independence property which was given almost entirely. 
to the respondent. It is the plaintiff's content~on that 
the distribution of the trial court in that regard was 
inequitable and effectually ignored the $23,000.00 contribution 
to the property of the parties by the appellant. 
The Independe.nce property was acquired by the ;respondent 
prior to marriage for the price of $14,250.00. (Pl. Exhibit 1). 
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At the time of the marriage, November 22, 1972, the respondent 
had paid $10,000.00. (Pl. Exhibit l}. Then from the joint 
funds of the marriage $1,178.75 was paid in 1973, $1,123.25 on 
November 5, 1974, $1,178.75 on March 1, 1974 and the remaining 
balance on rebruary 27, 1976. (Pl. Exhibit 1) 
The Independence Property was sold on March 7, 1976 for 
the price of $43~500.00. ·The buyers paid $12,615.00 down 
with payments of $5,000.00 to be paid annually through 1983. 
(Pl. Exhibit 11. 
The Court allowed the defendant a credit on his pre-maritaJ 
assets of $33,522.50 for the value of the Independence property 
at the time of divorce and ruled that the portion of the sales 
price of the Independence property attributed to t~e joint 
efforts of the parties during the marriage was only $10,027.50, 
which· sum would be divided between the parties, leaving the 
appellant with $5,013.75 out of _the total profit which did not 
include interest. tR. 133, paragraph Sa). 
There is no dispute that the sales contract to the Inde-
pendence property ran to both parties jointly, yet the_. 
appellant is to receive only a miniscule portion of the total 
p;r-ofit. The Court established the amount of the proceeds to 
be given the respondent from the Independence property by 
determining the percentage of the $14,250.00 purchase price, 
that had been paid by the respondent before marriage. There 
are several gross inadequacies created by the apportionment 
made by the Court. 
First, even though the property appreciated in value duri~ 
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the time the couple was married, the respondent's portion of 
that increase was established by the relationship of the down 
payment to the sales price irrespective of the amount of 
appreciation during the course of the marriage. Further, even 
though the property's sale value was not reached until the 
marriage was over, the respondent is allowed to take the 
appreciated value, in its entirety, as a pre-marital asset. 
For example, if a piece of property was purchased for $1,000-.00, 
and $900.00 was paid, before marriage, by one of the parties, 
it would be unfair to award that party ninety percent (90%) of 
the proceeds of the sale when the appreciation, accruing 
during marriage, belongs to both parties~ Otherwise, the party 
not credited with the initial purchase would essentially gain 
nothing from the investment during the marriage term. 
Most amazingly, even though the Independence property was 
only worth approximately $14,250.00 at the time of the marriage, 
the court has allowed t;.he respondent to take the value o~ years 
of appreciation, most of which occurred during the marriage 
with the appellant, and retroactively apply the post-marital 
appreciated amount as a pre-marital asset which can be credited 
against any asset of the marriage. 
It is submitted that if, after a couple was married, a 
decision was made to sell the Independence property, and the 
proceeds invested somewhere else, the parties would be entitled 
to share equally in the return on the proceeds of the new 
investment. But, as structured by the Court, the increase in 
the value of the Independence property, ran almost exclusively 
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to the defendant. lf the p;r:'operty outlined in the hypothetical 
above appreciated from $1,000.00 to $15,000.00 in value during 
the course of the marriage, it would be inequitable, tq say 
the least, to allow the party purchasing the property for 
$900.00, before marriage, to receive approximately ninety perce 
(90%) of the proceeds when the real increase·in value was joint 
property in that the apprec;iation accrued during marriage, in 
which both parties should share equally. 
Second, under the formula created by the Court, the 
defendant not only retains, under the hypothetical set out. 
above, ninety percent ·(90%} of the proceeds of the sale out-
right, he is entitled to one-half of the remaining percentage 
because the court termed ·the remainder as joint property. 
Reference to the hypothetical above sets out and clarifies 
the inadequacies of the formula employed by the Court. If the 
property, used as an illustration above; was sold for $15,000.0 
the party purchasing the property before marriage gets ninety 
percent (90%) of the proceeds which is $13,500.00. Then, out 
of the remaining $1,500.00, termed joint property, the party 
purchasipg the property before marriage shares equally and gets 
an additional $750. 00, leaving the other party with only $750.0 
Third, the Court credited the respondent's pre-marita1 
assets with the amount of down payment that he made on the 
Independence property, CR. 132, paragraph 2) , which, under the 
hypothetical, would exhaust all·' the funds. Thus, the responder 
in this case is allowed approximately eighty percent (80%} of 
the proceeds of the sale of the Independence property outright 
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Since the Court termed the remaining twenty percent (20%) of 
the profit as joint property, the defendant is allowed one-half 
of that amount, thus bringing the total to ninety percent 
(90%}. Then, the defendant is given credit for the $10~000.00 
down payment which he made prior to marriage, reducing the 
appellant's share in the property to almost nothing. By the 
Court's computation, the respondent was allowed to isolate 
for himself almost One hundred percent of a significant asset 
belonging to both parties. 
In stark contrast to the method used by.the·Court in 
allocating the proceeds from the Independence property, the 
Court allowed the parties to share equally in the proceeds 
of all the other real property despite the fact that the 
appellant had contributed over $23,000.00 of pre-marital 
assets towards the purchase of that property~ As stated above, 
the parties were married on November 22, ·1972. The parties 
purchased the White ~ocks property, one month prior, on . 
October 25, 1972. (T. 220}. The purchase price was $68,500~00. 
(Pl. Exhibit 1). The appellant paid $20,000.00 down which was 
derived solely from the appellant's pre-marital assets. (T. 221}. 
It is undisputed that none of the assets belonging to 
Mr. Wilcken, the respondent, were used in the down payment on 
this property. After the marriage, the parties contributed 
an additional $5,000.00 which was paid in October, 1973. 
{T. 221}. The property was sold on April 10, 1974 for 
$102,700.00, netting a profit to the parties in the amount of 
$40,126.00. 
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In its Finding$ of Fact #6, the Court found that the procee1 
of the sale of the White :Rocks property: 
went to the purchase of the Gusher and 
Bluebell property, and although not all 
the money was specifically accounted for 
the Court feels that some of it probably 
went into the woodshed business and that 
some probably went to miscellaneous and 
personal expenses 0£ the:parties. 
Paragraph #7: 
The Court further finds that some of the. 
prof it from the sale of the Gusher pro-
perty went to the purchase of the North 
Fork property and that a portion of the 
capital investment of the Gusher property 
went into the Bluebell property, but that 
in any event the profit and capital in-
vested in the White Rocks and Gusher 
properties has been reinvested by the 
parties in properties they continue to 
hold on the North Fork of the Duchesne 
and in the Bluebell ranch. The Court 
finds that these properties represent the 
joint efforts of the parties during their 
marriage and that the same should be sold 
and the proceeds divided as above indi-
cated. 
{R. 133-34). In respect to the other real prope~ty owned by 
the parties, the Court found: 
5) During their mar.riage, the parties 
have acquired certain real and personal 
property, to-wit: the Bluebell ran.ch; 
the 10 acre tract on the Duchesne river; 
the 11 acre tract on the Duchesne river; 
a cabin on said acreage on the Duchesne 
river; the woodshed; bank accounts; and 
other miscellaneous property, all of which 
should be equally divided between the parties 
except as hereinafter adjusted and set 
forth by the Court. tn particular, the 
Court finds: 
a. the portion of the Independence 
property attributed to the joint efforts 
of the parties during the marriage is in 
the sum of $10,027.50 and that sum should 
-10-
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be equally divided between the parties. 
b. the 10 a.ere tract and 11 acre 
tract on the North Fork of the Duchesne 
river, together with any improvements 
thereon should be sold and the proceeds 
divided equally between the plaintiff and 
defendant. 
(R. 133-34). 
Under the Court's calculations, the appellant was credited 
with $23,000.00 of pre-marital ·ass~ts, representing the amounts 
of money used by the plaintiff to purchase the White Rocks pro-
perty. The similarity between how the Court calculated the 
distribution of the Independence property and the rest of the 
property ends with that similarity. There is no calculation, 
on the part of the Court, to calculate the percentage of the 
total purchase price represented by the appellant's down payment. 
Thus, even though the plaintiff provided $23,000.00 of her 
pre-marital assets for the purchase of property, which amount 
is twice that invested by the defendant, the plaintiff receives 
nothing more than a credit to her pre-marital assets in the 
amount of $23,000.00 and recognizes no percentage of the appre-
ciation of the various pieces of property. There can be little 
doubt that the method by which the Court used to distribute the 
real properties of the parties, was grossly unjust and in~quitable. 
Accordingly, all of the real property of the parties should 
either be sold and both be allowed to join equally in the proceeds, 
or, the plaintiff should receive the same benefit on her $23,000.00 
investment as the defendant recognized on his $10,000.00. 
POINT II 
-11-
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THE COUR,T ERRED IN NOT DEDUCTING E'ROM THE 
RESPONDENT'S J?R.E-MARITAL ASSETS, THE 
AMOUNT OF HIS J?R,E-MARITAL DEBTS. 
The respondent's pre-marital assets are listed in paragrap 
2 of the second amended findings of fact as follows: 
PRE-MARITAL P;ROPER,TY OF THE DEFENDANT, LEONARD THEODORE 
WI LC KEN 
1958 International Tractor 
1969 GMC l?ickup 
Horse Tack 
2-Horse Trailer 
1 Hay Wagon 
Savings Bonds 
50 Head of Cattle plu? 45 head 
Forest perrnit 
2 bulls at $500.00 each 
less cost of rai?ing stock 
sub-total 
The following property having an aggregate 
value of $33,522.50, based upon the 
percentage of the original purchase 
price paid by defendant prior to 
marriage and the percentage of the 
purchase price paid by the parties 
after marriage, in relationship to 
the total sales price of the property. 
TOTAL CONTRIBUTION 














The respondent testified that he corrunented to friends duri1 
1974, that the period of time the plaintiff was married was the 
first time in his life he had ever been out of debt. (T. 334). 
The respondent testified that at the time he was married to the 
appellant he had a debt at G .M.A. C. of $900. 00; $2, 500. 00 to thE 
credit Union; $3,198.00 to Kamas State Bank and about $2,000.00 
on the stock for a total of $8,598.00. (T. 334-5}. The Court 
simply did not deduct from the respondent's pre-marital assets, 
the substantial debt owing thereon which was clearly error. 
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In addition, the a.ppellant furnished newly discovered evi-
dence in post-trial motions that the respondent took out a loan 
for $19,100.00 f,rom the Utah Farm Production Credit. The docu-
ments indicate that the loan was taken out on November 14, 
1972, eight days before the marriage in the name of the defendant 
only. (R. 155-6, 171-4). It seems inconceivable that the 
Court would allow the respondent a credit in the amount of 
$31, 500. 00 for. his cattle yet not deduct the substantial farm · 
debt that was retired by the parties during the course of the 
marriage. 
l?OINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE PLAINTIFF'S. 
MOTION roR A NEW TRIAL. 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure deals with the 
granting of new trials. 1'he grounds upon which a new trial may 
be granted are designated in subsection (a) of that rule. One 
~ of these grounds is newly discovered evidence, which is set out 
as follows: 
Ia] a new trial may be granted to all or 
any of the parties in and on all or part 
of the issues, for any of· the following 
causes: ... (4) newly discovered evi-
dence, material for the party making the 
application 1 which he could not, with 
reasonable diligence, have discovered and 
produced at trial. 
Plaintiff produced, in post-trial motions, evidence which 
tested the defendant's credulity. 
The respondent .testified that he received the sum of $31,500.00 
for a grazing permit and cows owned by him prior to marriage. 
(T. 296-8}. Despite ~r. Wilcken's testimony, the defendant's tax 
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returns for the yea,r~ 1972 and 1973 indicate tha,t in fact, the 
defendant owned 48 cows at the time of h,is ·:marriage to the .plain .. 
tiff and not the 50 COW$ indicated in his testimony. The value 
given to those 48 cows on his ,income tax, however, is only 
$4,900.00. Nowhere in the defendant's tax returns for the 
years 1972 through 1976 is there a~y income listed from the 
sale of cows acquired before marriage which supports the 
defendant's figure of $3,500.00 Nowhere in the· defendant'·s 
tax returns are there any figures which would support the· 
defendant's claims th.at cows were sold for anything near the 
$700.00 a head testified on direct examination. The .defendant 
admitted that his statements were not reflected on the income 
tax. (T. 330-33}. The evidence proferred to the Court took 
the form of sales receipts given by Zane Christensen to the 
respondent upon the sale of the cows that the defendant brought 
to the marriage and the bank records concerning the sale to Joe 
Curry of° the ·forest grazing permit that was also brought to the 
marriage. Those receipts show that contrary to the defendant's 
testimony that th~ sale of the cows brought receipts of $31,500. 
the actual value received for the cows and the forest permit was 
only $9,200.00. (R. 154, 155, 162-168; Pl. Ex. 2, 3, 4, and 5}. 
The highest sale reflected in the defendant's tax returns is~ 
the year 197 4 which lists the sale of cows at approximately $400 
a head. The most the defendant could have possibly grossed on 
the 48 cattle owned at the time of marriage was accordingly 
$11,000.00 as compa~ed to the $31,500.00 testified to by the 
defendant. 
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I"n toto, the evidence produced both during the trial 
and in plaintiff's motion for a new trial, based on new evidence, 
illustrate that the two largest items of pre-martial assets, 
the amount given for the Independence property and the amount 
·credited for the cows, were highly disproportionate to the true 
value. 
POINT JV 
THE COURT ERRED IN DEBITING THE APPELLANT'S 
PRE-MARITAL ,ASSETS IN THE SUM OF $10, 000. 00. 
The Court in paragraph 11 of the second amended findings of 
fact, debited the plaintiff's account by reason of the $10,000.00 
that the plaintiff allegedly gave her daughter by a previous 
marriage from the joint funds of the parties. (R. 135). 
The Court assumed that the dispursement to the daughter was 
a gift but the evidence.was contrary to that conclusion. 
The Wood Shed is a business in Roosevelt which the parties 
_owned jointly with the appellant's daughter and husband. (T. 234). 
The parties were in the business of refinishing furniture, and 
selling various inventory items. (T. 235). The. evidence 
indicated ,that the business was worth approximately $20, 000. 00_. 
~- 385, 314. 350}. 
The appellant testified that the $9,000.00 payment was to 
buy out her daughter and son-in-law's interest in the Wood Shed. 
(T. 386). Even the defendant testified to that effect. (T. 
314-15). The Court was unjustified in concluding that the pay-
ment was a gift in that both parties agreed that the business 
included the daughter and ~on-in-law who were entitled to half 
·the proceeds . 
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It is the a.ppella.nt's contention that the debiting of 
her pre-marital assets. by $10, 000. 00 be:::ause she a,llegedly gave 
that amount to her daughter during the course of the marriage, 
is wholly unsupported by the evidence. The only evidence offer 
on the subject was the testimony of the.plaintiff who said that 
this amount, $9,000;00 instead of $10,000.00, was given to her 
daughter not as a gift, but as consideration for her daughter's 
and son-in-law's one-half interest in the Wood Shed business. 
(T. 386). The appellant testified further that the Wood Shed 
business was not capitalized by the joint funds of the parties, 
but was established by the institutional loan money which was 
paid back out of the proceeds of the business. (T. 363). 
Plaintiff also testified that her daughter and son-in-law· 
invested substantial time and effort in the Wood Shed business 
for which they received no salary. Thus, for the court to 
hold that the appellant's account must be debited by $10,000.00 
which was not a gift, is wholly unsupported by any evidence 
adduced at trial. 
CONCLUSION 
It is the appellant's contention that the large disparity 
in the pre-marital assets of the ~arties is accounted for by 
the three substantial errors of the lower court in making the 
distribution of the property. It is hard to imagine the ration 
employed by the lower court in preferentially treating the 
Independence property over the other properties owned by the 
parties. Yet, the court by ;l ts calculations, gave the respon-
dent over a $30,000.00 windfall. Second, the trial court si~: 
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did not make an attem.pt to debit the respondent's pre-marital 
assets by the amount o;f his pre-marital debt. As outlined in the 
argument, there was very little that the respondent brought into 
the marriage that was not encumbered. Lastly, the debiting of the 
appellant's pre-martial assets by the alleged gift in the amount 
of $10,000.00 is totally contrary to the evidence. The only 
person testifying substant~vely on the issue was the appell~nt 
who testified that the money was paid to sever the joint owner-
ship of the Wood Shed business. Any other construction of the 
evidence simply has no support in the record. It is respectfully 
submitted that this court must correct the three tragic errors 
committed by the trial court which led to such a devastating and 
inequitable result for the appellant. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of April, 1980. 
RICHARD B. J SON, for: 
HOWARD, LEWI & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Appellant 
NAILED a copy of the foregoing Brief to Mr. George E. Mangan, 
Attorney for Defendant-Respondent, P.O. Box 246, Roosevelt, Utah 
84066; dated th!s 21st day of April, 1980. 
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